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Ancillarity Principle and a Statistical Paradox

V.P. GODAMBE*

Among the many reasons underlying the practice of randomization some of the main ones can be described as *averaging out* or *elimination* of the effects of nuisance parameters. It is already well known (Godambe 1966) that averaging over all the possible results of the adopted randomization is directly in conflict with the *likelihood principle*. The process of elimination of nuisance parameters has possibly deeper intuitive appeal. But this process contradicts a very basic principle of statistical inference subsequently defined as the *ancillarity principle*. This is demonstrated in relation to a practice of randomization called *balanced sampling*. We would use a formalism very similar to that of Birnbaum (1962).

KEY WORDS: Randomization; Balanced sampling; Ancillarity.

1. ANCILLARITY PRINCIPLE

A statistical experiment or a model M is defined as a triplet $(\chi, \Omega, \mathbf{P})$ where $\chi = \{x\}$ is an abstract sample space, $\Omega = \{\theta\}$ is an abstract parameter space and $\mathbf{P} = \{P_\theta: \theta \in \Omega\}$ is a class of distributions on χ indexed by the parameter θ . For simplicity we assume χ and Ω to be finite. The inference one can make on the basis of an observation x (in χ) given the experiment M can be denoted by $\text{Inf}(\cdot | x, M)$, leaving, however, the function uncharacterized as in Birnbaum (1962).

The ancillarity principle. If P_θ is the same for all $\theta \in \Omega$, then $\text{Inf}(\cdot | x, M)$ is the same for all x in χ . In other words no inference about θ is possible on the basis of an observation x , under the experiment M .

2. A PARADOX

Using the notion in Section 1 here we have $\theta = \theta = (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_i, \dots, \theta_N)$ and

$$\Omega = \left\{ \theta: \theta_i = 1 \text{ or } -1, i = 1, \dots, N \text{ and } \sum_1^N \theta_i = 0 \right\}. \quad (2.1)$$

Further set $\mathcal{P} = \{1, \dots, N\}$, let n be a positive integer less than N , and let S denote the set of all subsets of \mathcal{P} with n elements. Next we have,

$$P_\theta(s) = 1/N C_n, \quad s \in S, \quad (2.2)$$

and

$$\mathbf{P} = \{P_\theta: \theta \in \Omega\} \quad (2.3)$$

Thus (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) define a statistical experiment

$$M \equiv (\chi, \Omega, \mathbf{P}), \quad (2.4)$$

where $\chi = S$. Now the *ancillarity principle* of Section 1 in relation to the experiment M in (2.4) implies that for any two $s', s'' \in S$,

$$\text{Inf}(\cdot | s', M) \equiv \text{Inf}(\cdot | s'', M). \quad (2.5)$$

This, however, is contradicted by the following mode of inference.

Using (2.1) and (2.2) let

$$t(s, \theta) = \left| \sum_{i \in s} \theta_i / n \right|, \quad s \in S, \theta \in \Omega.$$

If s' is observed from the distribution (2.3) consider all θ' (in Ω) satisfying $t(s', \theta') > k$ for a suitably large k , as *implausible* values. (2.6)

Note. In the preceding mode of inference the observation (or data) consists of s' only. In particular $(\theta_i: i \in s')$ is not part of the data. The distribution of s' is given by (2.3). Further, on the basis of two observations s' and s'' , the set of values θ considered implausible are *different* for

$$\{\theta: t(s', \theta) > k\} \neq \{\theta: t(s'', \theta) > k\}.$$

Hence the mode of inference (2.6) contradicts the *ancillarity principle*. To make the paradox clearer we emphasize that (assuming suitable n, N, k) for every s' there are values of θ in Ω for which $t(s', \theta) > k$. These values according to (2.6) however are not considered implausible, when s' is observed.

The intuitive appeal of (2.6) (for sufficiently large n and N), follows from the fact that, if for every $s \in S$ in (2.2)

$$\bar{\theta}_s = \sum_{i \in s} \theta_i / n, \quad (2.7)$$

then for every $\theta \in \Omega$ in (2.1), $\bar{\theta}_s$ has a fixed distribution, having the expectation and variance given by

$$E_\theta(\bar{\theta}_s) = 0 \text{ and } v_\theta(\bar{\theta}_s) = \left(\frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{N} \right) \frac{N}{N-1}. \quad (2.8)$$

Obviously $v_\theta(\bar{\theta}_s)$ would be negligibly small for sufficiently

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large n and N . For instance for $n = 10,000$, $v_{\theta}(\bar{\theta}_s) < .0001$, $\theta \in \Omega$.

A more precise version of the mode of inference (2.6) is as follows. Let $N = 4$ and $n = 2$. Suppose further that Ω consists of only two points θ' and θ'' , where $\theta' = (1, -1, -1, 1)$ and $\theta'' = (-1, 1, -1, 1)$. Now $t(s, \theta)$ in (2.6) can take only two values 0 and 1. Further $P_{\theta}(t(s, \theta) = 0) = 4/6$ and $P_{\theta}(t(s, \theta) = 1) = 2/6$ for $\theta = \theta', \theta''$. Now if $s' = (2, 4)$, $t(s', \theta') = 0$ and $t(s', \theta'') = 1$. Hence on the basis of the observation s' we prefer θ' to θ'' . On the other hand, if $s'' = (2, 3)$, $t(s'', \theta') = 1$ and $t(s'', \theta'') = 0$ hence on s'' we prefer θ'' to θ' .

From the example just discussed, it should be clear that the mode of inference in (2.6) is free of any assumption concerning prior probability distribution on Ω . In fact, as is clear from the example, even complete specification of Ω is not necessary. Further, the statistical inference as in (2.6) is not restricted to simple random sampling in (2.3) only. For a more complicated sampling design given in Section 3, inference about θ on the basis of s is obtained by replacing in (2.6), $|\sum_{i \in s} \theta_i/a_i|$ by $|\sum_{i \in s} \theta_i/a_i|$.

When the author discussed the preceding situation with H. Robbins, the latter suggested a more descriptive version. With the author's elaboration it is as follows: Let $2N$ exactly identical slips of paper be spread on a table. On the hidden face of each slip is written a number, $+1$ or -1 . It is known that some N slips bear the number $+1$ and the remaining N slips bear the number -1 . The unknown state of nature or the unknown parameter (θ) here is determined precisely by naming the slips that bear $+1$ (and -1). The $2^N C_N$ possible values of the parameter θ are denoted by Ω ; $\Omega \equiv \{\theta\}$. Now out of the $2N$ slips a random sample s of N slips is drawn without replacement. On the basis of the sample s so drawn, the following inference about the unknown parameter θ is immediately suggested by the frequency definition of probability. The values of θ in Ω which assign for the N slips that constitute the sample s , proportion of $+1$'s greater than $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon_N$ or smaller than $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon_N$ (for a suitably chosen ϵ_N , if $N = 1,000,000$, ϵ_N may be .001), are implausible. Yet the distribution of s is independent of θ , that is, is the same for all $\theta \in \Omega$. That is, the frequency performance of the above procedure of inference, in repeated sampling, would be identical on the true value of the parameter, θ_0 , say, and any alternative value, say, θ_1 !

3. THE PARADOX WITH UNEQUAL PROBABILITY SAMPLING

Suppose an agricultural field is divided into N plots numbered i ; as before in (2.2) $\mathcal{P} = \{i\}$, $i = 1, \dots, N$, and $S = \{s\}$ is the set of all subsets s containing exactly n plots. The yield and area of the plot i are y_i and a_i , respectively, $i = 1, \dots, N$. The vector $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_i, \dots, a_N)$ is known but the vector $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_i,$

$\dots, y_N)$ is unknown. We write $\sum_1^N a_i = A$, $\sum_1^N y_i = Y$, and $Y = A\phi$. To estimate the unknown parameter ϕ we draw from S a sample s using a sampling design p ($p: S \rightarrow [0, 1]$, $\sum_S p(s) = 1$) and observe the yields y_i for all plots i in s . Let $y_i = a_i\phi + \theta_i$, $i = 1, \dots, N$. Then since $Y = A\phi$, $\sum_1^N \theta_i = 0$. Hence we have

$$\frac{y_i}{a_i} = \phi + \frac{\theta_i}{a_i}, i = 1, \dots, N \tag{3.1}$$

where the vector $\theta = (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_i, \dots, \theta_N)$ is unknown except that $\theta \in \Omega$ where

$$\Omega = \left\{ \theta: \sum_1^N \theta_i = 0 \right\}. \tag{3.2}$$

(The Ω in (3.2) should be distinguished from the one in (2.1).) Now for any specified (given) θ and the data $(s, y_i; i \in s)$, ϕ is given by

$$\phi(\theta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in s} \frac{y_i}{a_i} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in s} \frac{\theta_i}{a_i}. \tag{3.3}$$

Since, however, the vector θ is unknown, we investigate whether there exists a sampling design to select s , so that in some sense $\phi(\theta)$ in (3.3) would not be much dependent on the nuisance parameter θ . (The estimate $\sum_{i \in s} y_i/na_i$ is also optimum for ϕ under some additional assumptions not related to the present discussion.) That is, we search for a design that provides (in the extended sense of the term) *balanced sampling*. Consider a sampling design p_0 obtained as follows: The set $\mathcal{P} = \{i, i = 1, \dots, N\}$ is divided in n strata \mathcal{P}_j ($\mathcal{P} = \cup_1^n \mathcal{P}_j$) such that $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{P}_j} a_i = A/n$, $j = 1, \dots, n$. Then from each stratum j one individual is drawn with selection probabilities for different individuals i , na_i/A , $i \in \mathcal{P}_j$. Note in the present case if $s \ni i$ denotes all samples in S that contain the individual i then

$$\sum_{s \ni i} p_0(s) = na_i/A, i = 1, \dots, N. \tag{3.4}$$

Now if E denotes the expectation and V the variance with respect to the above sampling design p_0 , from (3.1) and (3.2) we have for every ϕ and $\theta \in \Omega$,

$$\begin{aligned} E\left(\sum_{i \in s} \theta_i/na_i\right) &= \sum_1^N \theta_i/A = 0, \\ E\left(\sum_{i \in s} y_i/na_i\right) &= \sum_1^N y_i/A = \phi; \end{aligned} \tag{3.5}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} V\left(\sum_{i \in s} y_i/na_i\right) &= V\left(\sum_{i \in s} \theta_i/na_i\right) \\ &= (1/nA) \sum_1^N \theta_i^2/a_i - (1/A^2) \sum_1^n \left(\sum_{\mathcal{P}_j} \theta_i\right)^2. \end{aligned} \tag{3.6}$$

Further, let a subset of Ω in (3.2) be given by

$$\Omega' = \left\{ \theta: \left| \theta_i/a_i \right| \leq \beta, \right. \\ \left. i = 1, \dots, N; \sum_1^N \theta_i = 0 \right\}, \quad (3.7)$$

for some specified number β . From (3.6) for all $\theta \in \Omega'$ in (3.7) we have

$$V(\sum_{i \in s} y_i/na_i) = V(\sum_{i \in s} \theta_i/na_i) \leq (\beta^2/n). \quad (3.8)$$

Now we assume that the vector \mathbf{a} is such that the population \mathcal{P} can be divided into a sufficiently large number n of strata satisfying $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{P}_j} a_i = A/n, j = 1, \dots, n$ and $\beta^2/n \leq \epsilon^2, \epsilon$ being a given small number. Then from (3.8) we have

$$V(\sum_{i \in s} y_i/na_i) = V(\sum_{i \in s} \theta_i/na_i) \leq \epsilon^2. \quad (3.9)$$

In the sense of (3.5) and (3.9) the sampling design p_0 indeed reduces the effect of the nuisance parameter θ on $\phi(\theta)$ in (3.3) provided $\theta \in \Omega'$. Thus sampling design p_0 provides balanced sampling. To obtain the confidence intervals for ϕ we note from (3.1) that

$$[|\sum_{i \in s} y_i/na_i - \phi| \leq 3\epsilon] \Leftrightarrow [|\sum_{i \in s} \theta_i/na_i| \leq 3\epsilon]; \quad (3.10)$$

hence if $P(\cdot | \theta, \phi)$ denotes the probability of (\cdot) for given

θ and ϕ we have

$$P(|\sum_{i \in s} y_i/na_i - \phi| \leq 3\epsilon | \theta, \phi) \\ = P(|\sum_{i \in s} \theta_i/na_i| \leq 3\epsilon | \theta, \phi). \quad (3.11)$$

If $\theta \in \Omega'$ in (3.7), with (3.5) and (3.9) the left side of (3.11) provides the usual inference about ϕ . But this inference because of (3.10) is logically equivalent to the inference about θ obtained from the right side of (3.11). This latter inference about θ , however, contradicts the ancillarity principle for the reasons given in Section 2. It therefore follows that the inference about ϕ based on the left side of (3.11) is also paradoxical in relation to the ancillarity principle.

A brief statement of the paradox appeared in Godambe (1979), which in turn was commented on by Dawid (1979) and Good (1980).

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